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A Petition for a Writ of Certiorari: 
QUESTION'S PRESENTED 
Did the presiding panel of the Court of Appeal's render a dicision 
in conflict with a dicision of another panel of the Court of Appeal's, 
on the same issue of Law (State v. Haqen, Supea)? 
Did the presiding panel of the Court of Appeal's render a dicision 
substantially departing from the accepted and usual course of 
Judicial Proceedings surmounting Jurisdictional challenge, that 
sanctions inconsistant lower court procedure, mandating this court's 
plenary power and corrective supervision? 
Did the presiding panel of the Court of Appeal's decide a question 
of federal interpretational law and statute that is in conflict 
with Judicial Decision's and federal mandate of the United State's 
District, Circuit, and U.S. Supreme Court's? 
Did the presiding panel of the Court of Appeal's decide an important 
question of Federal Law, that should be reviewed by, and settled 
by, this Court? 
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_TV_ 
Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The 
Utah Court Of Appeals For The State 
Of Utah 
Petitioner James F. Gardner, acting in Pro-Se capacity, 
hereby respectfully pray's that a Writ of Certiorari issue to 
review under presumption of correctness. The Final Judgement 
and opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals for the State of Utah, 
entered in the above-entitled Cause of Action on March 18,1992, 
Judges, Bench, Billings, and Russon. 
I 
Opinion Below: 
The memorandum opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals is 
attached as Appendix A. No. opinion was issued by the District 
Court for the Eighth Judicial District of Utah. 
II 
Jurisdiction; 
The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the State of Utah 
was filed March 18, 1992. The Jurisdiction of this Court is 
invoked pursuant to Rule 42, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
Ill 
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Other Citations involved 
A.) Constitutional Provisions: 
Article 1, Section 7; 
"No person shall be deprived of Life, Liberty, or Pro-
perty, without due process of the law", (1896). 
Article 1, Section 25: 
"This enumeration of Rights shall not be construed to im-
pair or deny others retained by the People", (1896). 
Article III, Ordinance 2: 
[Rights to public domain disclaimed Taxation of lands 
exemption] 
Second: The People inhabiting this State do affirm and declare 
that they forever disclaim all right and title to the unappro-
priated public lands lying within said limits owned or held by 
any Indian or Indian Tribes, and that until the title thereto 
shall have been extinguished by the United States, the same 
shall be and remain subject to the disposition of the United 
States; and said Indian Lands shall remain under the absolute 
Jurisdiction and control of the Congress of the United 
States, (1947). 
B.) Federal Statutes involved: 
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of 1848 (9 Stat. 108). 
The Treaty of December 3, 1849 (9 Stat. 984). 
The Executive Order of October 3, 1861 (I Kappler 900). 
The Treaty of October 7, 1863 (13 Stat. 673: II Kappler 856). 
The Act of May 5, 1864 (13 Stat. 63). 
The Act of February 24, 1865 (13 Stat. 432). 
The Unratified Treaty of June 8, 1865 (V Kappler 695). 
The Treaty of March 2, 1868 (15 Stat. 619). 
The Act of April 29, 1874 (18 Stat. 36). 
The Act of June 18, 1878 (20 Stat. 165). 
The Act of June 15, 1880 (21 Stat. 199). 
The Act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat. 984). 
The Act of August 9, 1937 (50 Stat. 564, 573). 
The Act of August 27, 1954 (68 Stat. 868). 
The Act of July 14, 1956 (68 Stat. 873). 
C.) Other Citations involved: 
The Constitution and By-Laws of the Ute Indian Tribe of the 
Uintah and Ouray Reservation. 
Public Law 717, 84th Cong., chap. 603, 2nd Sess, H.R. 
7663 (1956). 
Public Law 102-137, (October 28, 1991). 
IV 
Statement of Facts: 
Petitioner James F. Gardner, was charged in the Seventh 
(Eighth) Judicial District Court with a single count of second 
degree feloney forgery, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501 (3)(B)(1990). 
He was found guilty as charged by jury trial on August 14,1985, 
and sentenced to serve one to fifteen years at the Utah State 
Prison, (State-V-Gardner, case No. 85-CR-80-D). 
On or about June 20, 1989, Petitioner sought post-convic-
tion relief in the Trial Court, alleging that he had ask his 
Trial Counsel to appeal his conviction shortly after Trial, 
and that Counsel failed to honor that request. Premised on 
evidentiary proceedings, on April 2, 1990, the court found the 
allegations to be true, and on April 19, 1990, the court re-
sentenced the Petitioner Nunc-Pro-Tunc, allowing the perfection 
of direct appeal. 
*Other than miscellanious records, the following filing order 
is relevent to this court's review: 
On or about April 15, 1991, the Court of Appeals granted 
the motion of counsel withdrawal, allowing Petitioner Gardner 
to proceed in Pro-Se capacity for jurisdictional challenge, 
(State-V-Gardner, case No. 900379-Ca, Utah App. 1992). 
On or about May 17, and 29, 1991, Petitioner sought suspen-
sion of his appeal and filed various motions, including: mo-
tion for En Banc De Novo determination of criminal jurisdic-
tion: and memorandum in support thereof: motion for leave of 
remand for District Court fact-finding proceedings; and motion 
and application of retroactive statutory interpretations; see-
king in necessary foundation, Jurisdictional Challenge. 
On or about June 10, 1991, the Court denied all said 
motions, but not their own motion, preserved all issues raised 
in those motions for plenary review of the case. 
On or about July 3, 1991, Petitioner filed the appeal brief 
before the Utah Court of Appeals, appealing the single issue of 
Jurisdictional Challenge premised on Indian Status. 
Petitioners appeal was extensive, raising issues of sub-
stial Constitutional guestion under the continuing claims doc-
trine; Petitioner addressed substantive guestions of State's 
lack of criminal jurisdictional guildlines for Indian Status 
jurisdictional challenge; The status Quo political seperation 
from racial classification to Indian and federal jurisdictions; 
Utah's ccnflict of interest in judicially defining and enforcing 
jurisdictional matter over Indian Country by lack of Territorial 
Authorities premised on Constitutional prohibitions of Article 
III, Ordinance 2, (Ut. Const.); Utah's recognition status of 
the Uintah Mix-Blood Ute Indians in State Legislative Law: 
Petitioner's Unequivical Indian Status under Uintah Ute Indian 
Affiliation and Association standards for Criminal Jurisdiction 
under 18 U.S.C.§ 1151-1153: and the states unquestionable lack 
of personal jurisdictions over Petitioner: 
On or about October 7, 1991, respondant counsel, J. Kevin 
Murphy, submitted his brief of appellee, in rebuttle of issues 
raised by Petitioner; The issues addressed by respondant counsel 
consisted of claimed defense's that: 
(I). The Jurisdictional problem was waived by Petitioner's 
failure to raise it in the trial court because....(A) To fall 
outside State Jurisdiction under present law, defendant must 
be Indian....(B) The Jurisdictional problem in this case was 
neither raised nor otherwise apparent to the trial court.... 
(C) The Indian Status issue should be deemed waived by defen-
dant's failure to raise it in the trial court: and (II). If 
Defendant is an Indian, he is subject to State Court Jurisdic-
tion under the Federal termination of supervision over Mix-
Blood Ute Indians; and (III). If the conviction cannot be 
affirmed otherwise, the Jurisdictional Issue should be remanded 
to the Trial Court where defendant should bear the burden of 
proof....(A) Because no evidence relating to Defendant's claimed 
Indian Status was presented in the trial court, there is not-
hing to review on appeal....(B) Defendant's Indian Status 
claim should be heard by the trial court on limited remand.... 
and (C) In the trial court, Defendant should bear the burden 
On or about October 21, 1991, Petitioner filed his reply 
brief of the appellant, rebutting respondant's claimed defenses 
and issues raised, by clarifying to the court that....(I) Pet-
itioner made dilegent effort to raise his Jurisdictional Chal-
lenge at trial court, and therefore, did not, and cannot waive 
challenge of State Jurisdiction....(II) Petitioner is an Indian 
and is subject to Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction, in light of 
his mother's termination of federal supervision as a Mix-Blood 
Ute Indian.... and (III) The Jurisdiction Issues should be ruled 
on as a matter of determinative law, with limited remand con-
sistant with final decision of the court: 
On or about November 4 and 19, 1991, Petitioner submitted 
citations of supplemental authorites, surmounting historical 
overview of issues raised. 
On or about February 7, 1992, Petitioner submitted supple-
mental case law central and relevent to judicial plenary re-
view, unequivically supporting Petitioner's claims and conten-
tions. Also filed on This Day was, motion for leave to submit 
other Historical and Genealogical Records in support of Peti-
tioner's affidavit. History, Document's and certifiable re-
cords unequivically supporting petitioner's ancestrial and ab-
original treaty relationship to the Uintah Band Ute Indians and 
the Uintah Valley Reservation (Uintah and Ouray Reservation) as 
a soveriegn, with additional case law reflecting the State's 
inability to abrogate or abridge petitioner's treaty status. 
On or about March 5, 1992, the Court of Appeal's denied 
petitioner's motion to suppliment the record for support in 
foundation of fact. 
On or about March 18, 1992, the Utah Court of Appeal's rend-
ered it's dicision over petitioner's appeal. The court, after 
establishing an overview of fact and Jurisdiction held that; 
"The challenge to jurisdiction based on Indian status could con-
cievably present a question of fact that would require remand for 
an Evidentiary Hearing. In the present case, however, remand is 
unnecessary because Gardner has not asserted fact's sufficient to 
challenge the jurisdiction of the trial court. Gardner assert's 
that he is a "Terminated Ute". The term "Terminated Ute" is synony-
mous with "Mix-Blood" Ute as used in 25 U.S.C. 677.V, see: Affili-
ated Ute Citizen's of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 92 S.Ct. 
1456, 1463 (1972). Gardner further asserts that he is associated 
with the Affiliated Ute Citizen's, an unincorporated association of 
"Mix-blood" Ute's orginized pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 677.e.Id. 
Therefore, even if we take as true the representations proffer-
ed in Gardner's affidavit, the trial court had Jurisdiction over 
Gardner because exclusive federal jurisdiction over "Mix-blood" 
Ute's has been terminated. [Conclusion] Gardner failed to pre-
sent facts sufficient to raise a jurisdictional challenge. We there-
fore affirm his conviction. 
Wherein, this Petition for a Writ of Certiorari has been sub-
mitted and Petitioner respectfully moves this Court to review and 
vocate the final decision of March 18, 1992, as rendered by the 
Panel of Judges, Bench, Billings and Russon, of the Utah Court of 
Appeal's. 
V 
Reasons for Granting the Writ: 
Point 1_. This case provides this court full and fair opportunity 
of correctness in clarifying the limits and boundries of 
federal interpretation and statutory application of the 
Ute Partition Act of 1954 (25 U.S.C.§§677-677AA. (1988), 
as it is applied to State Jurisdictional Authority and 
Dependant Mix-blood members. 
In the late 1940fs and 1950fs the United States Government 
embarked on a Policy to terminate its special relationship with 
American Indians as existed under the Constitution, treaties and 
Laws of the United States. Such Policies were contrary to the 
promises and committments made to the American Indians, thier 
respective Bands and Tribes. 
The Ute Partition Act, also known as the Ute Termination Act, 
was among several Acts passed by Congress in the furtherance of 
this Policy, and effectively terminated the federal trust supervis-
ion over 490 Mix-blood Ute Indians and thier property, but did not 
effect, by express congressional declaration, the said decendants 
of the original 490 dependant members to the act. 
The Ute Partition Act, codified At, 25 U.S.C. §§677-677,AA 
(1954), made no express reference that the natural decendants of 
the 490 Mix-bloods, were also subject to an ongoing conditioned 
termination. The only reference made regarding decendancy, par-
tained to Right of Inheritable Interest to Property. 
Petitioner Gardner was born to the natural parents of Darrell 
A. Gardner, an Uncompahgre Ute Indian, and Carma Colleen Reed Gard-
ner, a Uintah Ute Indian subject to effects of Termination, on 
August 30, 1963, on the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation of 
North-eastern Utah. Petitioner is recognized under his respective 
Uintah Band of the Ute Tribe, by other members therein, both Mix-
blood and Full-blood. And retaines aboriginal, ancestrial, and 
soveriegn status relationship under treaty to the Uintah Valley 
Reservation. And as clearly setforth in Petitioners Appeal breifs 
before the Court of Appeals, Petitioner is being wrongfully subject 
to treatments of Termination, a termination that he was not consent-
ually, constitutionally, statutorily and/or administratively a"Rec-
ognized dependant member of". 
The Statefs utilization of the Ute Partition Act, to justify an 
assumed congressional abrogation of petitioners soveriegn treaty 
rights to exclusive tribal and federal criminal jurisdictions, ab-
sent federal termination and/or abrogation of said rights, support 
an unconcionable and unconstitutional act, in direct violation of 
Article 1, section 7, (Ut. Const.), and the due process clause of 
the 14 t h Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
In the final dicision setforth on March 18, 1992, by the Utah 
Court of Appeals, the court discrimatly applied a standard of 
Plenary Review so contrary to Judicial norms, so as to constitute 
a blatant violation of Petitioners protected safeguards in treaty 
and constitutional law. 
The court in an obvious attempt to succumb to state political 
pressures, failed in proper application of Federal Interpretation 
of relevant statutes, Public Laws and Indian Treaties, and simply 
and arbitrarily created an unconstitutional "Blanket Cover" of 
termination over all Indians of Mix-blood decent. Procedure that 
is simply ludicrous within the context of American Indian Law. 
The Court indiscriminatly created plain error violations by mis-
interpreting and misrepresenting specific declarations exhibited 
by Petitioner, and created statements interpreted as Petitioner's, 
within the context in which they were not originally used, in an 
attempt to curcumvent substantive arguments and contentions sup-
ported in determinative Law, throughout Petitioner's Appeal. 
The only Judicial Rational before this Court of importance 
concerning Point 1_ Infa, is that "the difference between treaty 
right's and right's premised on Act's of Congress, are non-exist-
ant for purposes of Abrogating Indian Right's". United States v. 
Felter, 546 f. supp. 1002, 752 f. 2d 105 (10th Cir. 1985), and 
that "All Law's effecting Indian's must be strictly construed". 
Chapoose v. Clark, 607 f. supp. 1027 (D.C Utah 1985). 
Quite to the contrary of the afore-mentioned legal rational, 
the Court of Appeal's has taken a stand of Self-Interpretation of 
Federal Law, without fundimental review of Relevent Law, carving 
out an unconstitutional exception in violation of Article 1, sect-
ion 7, (Ut. Const.), wherein, this Court's rational is supportive 
of Petitioner's backdrop, that, the mandate of due process under 
Article 1, Section 7, of the Declaration of Right's in Utah's 
Constitution, "is comprehensive in its application to all activ-
ities of State Government, and that, it is the Provence of the 
Judiciary to assume that a claim of the denial of due process by 
an arm of State Government be heard, and if justified, that it be 
vindicated". Foot v. Board of Pardon's, 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 
(S. Ct. 1991). 
For reasons in Point I_ Supra, alone, the Court of Appeal's 
failed attempt to interperet federal law, created something that 
it is not, and mandates the immediate vacating of the dicision 
rendered on, March 18, 1992, by the Utah Court of Appeal's. 
Point 2J[. This case provides this Court full and fair opportun-
ity of correctness in clarifying the limits and bound-
ries of Indian Status Jurisdictional challenge consist-
ant with State Constitutional Provision's and State v. 
Haqen. Supra; 
It is unequivical that the issue of Jurisdictional challenge 
may be raised at any time, and cannot be waived by failure to 
raise it or by consent of the Partie's. St. Cloud v. United 
States, 702 f. supp. 1456, 1461 (D.C.D. 1988): In Re Carmen's 
Petition, 165 f. supp. 942, 950 (D.C. Cal. 1958), Aff'd Sub, nom., 
Dickson v. Carmen, 270 f. 2d 809 (9th Cir. 1959), Cert. Denied, 
361 U.S. 934, 80 S.Ct. 375, Reh' q Denied, 361 U.S. 973, 80 S.Ct. 
585 (1960): Wesley v. Schneckloth, 55 Wash. 2d 290, 346 P. 2d 
658, 662 (1959) (_En Banc) . It has also been historically accepted 
that a jurisdiction challenge may be first raised on direct appeal. 
State v. William's, 13 Wash. 335, 43 Pac. 15 ( ), and State v. 
Howard, 33 Wash. 250, 74 Pac. 387 ( ). 
As setforth in Petitioner's statement of fact's, Petitioner 
first raised Jurisdictional Challenge at trial stage to no avail. 
Whereupon direct appeal, Petitioner sought proper remand to Trial 
Court for Fact-finding Proceeding's necessary to establish founda-
tion of fact for Appellat Review (May 29, 1991). On June 10, 1991, 
the Court of Appeal's firmly rejected Petitioner's request's 
and motions for remand, while grantinq preservation of the issues 
for Plenary Review. 
Under Jurisdictional Challenge on Appeal, Petitioner setforth 
substantial argument and supportive Law, that the Trial Court lack 
personal, subject matter and territorial jurisdiction's over him, 
due to his Indian status. Premised on the Court's consistant re-
jection of Petitioner's request for limited remand, and the State's 
"Open Invitation" for remand, Petitioner was forced to rely solely 
on an affidavid of fact and geneology, as an attached addendum to 
his Appeal Breif, see; Appendix A, dicision of March 18, 1992, 
Utah Court of Appeal's: (Fact's; paragraph 3). 
Whether or not the Court of Appeal's properly followed an 
ethical approach to review under plenary authority, remains a 
Question of Law for this Court to determine, but it does seem 
quite ironic that the Court initially deemed the facts of the case 
sufficient for jurisdictional challenge under plenary review and 
the doctrine of State v. Haqen, Supra, 802 P.2d 745 (Utah App. 
1990), Cert. Granted, April 23, 1991, Utah Supreme Court, No. 
910017. And then to the contrary, affirmed Petitioner's conviction 
premised on the grounds that "Gardner failed to present facts suf-
ficient to raise a Jurisdictional Challenge". 
Simply put, Petitioner met necessary prerequisit's for federal 
criminal jurisdiction under the Haqen Doctrine and remains to be a 
soveriegn under Treaty, to the Uintah Valley Reservation. 
Because of the soveriegn status of Petitioner under Preserved 
Treaty Provisions (See: Point III, Infra), Article III, Ordenance 
2. (Ut. Const.) remains to be a relevent factor and substantive 
question of State Constitutional Law, that this Court must ad-
dress . 
Article III, Ordanence 2, of Utah's Constitution provides in 
Pertinent Part, that the people of this State forever disclaim 
All right and title to the unappropriated public lands and lands 
owned or held by any Indian or Indian Tribe, and that the same 
Shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the 
U.S. Congress. Supported by additional facts that, (1.) the Ute 
Indian Tribe has never ceded any form of Civil or Criminal Juris-
dictional Authority over Indian Inhabitants or Indian Country, to 
the State of Utah; (2.) That Indian Country includes all lands ly-
ing within the original exterior boundries of the Uintah and Ouray 
Reservation: (3.) That Congress has never allocated Civil or Crim-
inal Jurisdictions inherent in the Ute Tribe, under Public Law 280, 
to The State of Utah; (4.) That Public Law 102-137 of October 28, 
1991, mandates that Tribal Governments assume Civil and Criminal 
Jurisdiction over All Indians meeting Prerequisits to Indian Stat-
us, irrespective of Tribal enrollment and/or affiliation, and 
leaving no exception for wrongful State encroachment: and (5.) 
Each of the above cited Facts, stand consistant with Utah's Con-
stitutional Disclaimer, evidencing the States unlawful stand and 
continued prosecutions of soveriegn Uintah Ute Indians, whether 
Mix-blood or not. As setforth in Point III, Infra. The Uintah 
Band Utes are the only soveriegn's to this Uintah Valley Reservat-
ion, and no Act's of Congressional Legislation has capped and/or 
limited continued recognition in that Band, as the members therein 
deem appropriate under Thier Standards. 
As clearly defined in other cases of federal nature, the Uin-
tah Utes Treaty Rights servived Termination. United State's v. 
Felter, 546 f. supp. 1002, 752 f. 2d 105 (10th Cir. 1985), and 
the effects of Termination may only be applied to "Dependant mem-
bers named by legislation to the Act". 
As one Court held in Kimball v. Callahan, 590 f. 2d 768 (9th 
Cir. 1979), citing Kimball I, the Termination Act that affected 
that Tribe (Klamath's) did not abrogate Tribal Treaty Rights of 
Hunting, fishing and trapping. Neither did the Act affect the 
Soveriegn Authority of the Tribe to regulate the exercise of those 
Rights. The District Court properly held, that the Termination 
Act did not limit Treaty Rights to persons on the final roll, but 
that those Soveriegn Rights, also extended to the Decendant's of 
persons on the final roll. Id at IV, [Exercise of Treaty Rights 
by Decendants] * note: The Klamath Tribe was Terminated in its 
entirety. 
The Utah Court of Appeal's indifference and faulty approach to 
Plenary Review supports plain error violations mandating This 
Courts Supervisory Powers of correctiveness and should be treat-
ed as such. 
And the Court's total failure to address Substantive Constitu-
tional Questions over Article III, Ordenance 2's, Disclaimer must 
be deemed as a Judicial Referal to this Court's Supreme Authority. 
See: Rose-Bud Sioux Tribe v. South Dakata, 900 f. 2d 1164 (8 t h 
Cir. 199): State v. Spotted Horse, 462 n.w. 2d. 463 (S.D.1990): 
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S. ]64, 181 
(1972): William's v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1958), and therefore 
be despositively addressed as a matter of Determinitive Lav, and 
thereby, vacate the final dicision of March 18, 1992, rendered by 
Point III.This case provides this Court full and fair opportun-
ity of State Level Indian Treaty Interpretational Review 
of Uintah Band Ute Indians and thier Soveriegn Recognit-
ion Status to the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation 
of North-eastern Utah. 
The Utah Court of Appeal's in thier final decision of March 
18, 1992, conclusively determined that Petitioner was seeking a 
Jurisdictional Challenge to State Jurisdiction: By the Courts 
own conduct previously described, the Petitioner's direct appeal 
was no more than an empty shell, leading the Petitioner in ongoing 
futil attempts at securing foundation of fact. And arbitrarily, 
the Court went beyond thier refusal to except Petitioner's Affida-
vit supporting his Indian status, by refusing to allow the submit-
ion of supplimental attachments in support of the facts as estab-
lished in the Affidavit, Records, Documents and effects that uneq-
uivically setforth Petitioner's Uintah Ute Ancestry and Aboriginal 
Treaty status as a Soveriegn to the Uintah Valley Reservation (See, 
Court Order of March 5, 1992), Including Certifiable Census Records 
of the L.D.S. Church. 
Whether the State chooses to acknowledge it or not, Petitioner 
retains Treaty Rights to Federal and Tribal Jurisdictions through 
the ancestry of Both his parents by virtue of the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo of 1848 (9 Stat. 108), and the Treaty of December 3, 1849 
(9 Stat. 984). Through his Father, an Uncompahgre Ute Indian, by 
virtue of the Treaty of October 7, 1863 (13 Stat. 673: II Kappler 
856), Through his Mother, a Uintah Band Ute, by virtue of the Un-
ratified Treaty of June 8, 1856 (V Kappler 695), the Treaty of 
March 2, 1868 (15 Stat. 619), and the Executive Order of October 
3, 1861 (I Kappler 900)., and his aboriginal ancestry through 
such subsequent Act's as follows: The Act of May 5, 1864 (13 
Stat. 63): Act of February 23, 1865 (13 Stat. 432): Act of 
April 29, 1874 (18 Stat. 36): Act of June 18, 1878 (20 Stat, 165): 
Act of June 15, 1880 (21 Stat. 199): Act of May 24, 1888 (25 Stat. 
165): Act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat. 984): Act of August 9, 1937 
(50 Stat. 564, 573): Act of August 27, 1954 (68 Stat. 868): 
Act of July 14, 1956 (68 Stat. 873): and the Constitution and By-
Laws of the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reser-
vation . 
The Court of Appeal's has consistantly failed to acknowledge 
Petitioner's soveriegn relationship to the reservation. The issue 
of Tribal Enrollment is irrelevent in the context of these pro-
ceedings as Plaintiff still retains treaty status and recognition, 
association and affiliation under his respective band (Uintah and 
Uncompahgre). A recognition standard that has been established as 
a matter of right through all of the above legislation, and had nev-
er been limited in scope or intent. 
In 1934, the Uintah Band, Uncompahgre Band, and Whiteriver Bands 
of Ute Indians, formed the Ute Indian Tribe pursuant to the reorg-
inization Act of June 19, 1934, 35 U.S.C. 479, by adopting a con-
stitution and by-laws recognizing the members of each of the three 
Bands and providing that the individual bands and rights of thier 
members in the bands, would continue. 
As late as June of 1950, the Uintah Band, together with the 
Uncompahgre and Whiteriver Bands, were entering into agreements 
(See: 25 U.S.C. §672) as part of the Ute Partition Act, which re-
cognized the continued existance of the independant bands, in-
cluding the Uintah Band, providing in 677. R., of the Act, that 
"nothing in this subchapter shall affect any claim heretofore 
filed against the United State's by the Tribe, or the individual 
bands composing the Tribe". In 1956, following the Ute Partition 
Act, Congress adopted Public Law 717, 84 t h Cong.,Chap. 603, 2nd 
Sess. H.R. 7663, that further recognized the continued existance 
of the Bands, both Mix-blood and Full-blood. 
* Petitioner is a recognized Uintah Band member by other memb-
ers of the Band, and likewise, Petitioners Father is Uncompahgre 
Ute by Band affiliation: 
Legislative history between Congress and the Uintah and Uncom-
pahgre Ute Indians has always been consistant in individual band 
recognition of individual members. And the recognition standard 
of band affiliation is clearly an aspect of Interpretational Law 
that Congress has wisely chose to avoid. And further, Congress 
has never Granted Legeslative Passage allowing the State of Utah 
authority to interperet the recognition status of the individual 
bands contrary to legeslative exceptions of aboriginal and ancest-
rial recognition of its members. For the State of Utah to take 
such s stand would clearly violate the exclusive and absolute fed-
eral trust relationship between the Uintah Utes and the U.S. Gov-
ernment, and violate the soveriegn authority of the band itself, not 
to mention due process and equal protections of Petitioner, by 
the State's knowing and willful violation of Treaty Provisions 
Exclusive, and Petitioners Constitutional safeguards setforth in 
Article 1, section 25, (Ut. Const.) which Declares: 
"This enumeration of Rights shall not be construed 
to impair or deny others retained by the People'1 . (1896). 
For reasons herein, plain error has been established, and the fin-
al decision of March 18, 1992, rendered by the Utah Court of Appeal's, 
should forthwith, be vacated. 
VI 
Conclusion: 
This case presents important constitutional questions and 
issues regarding State Level Interpretation and review of Feder-
al Statutes. Public Laws, and Treaties, in creation of Uniform 
Jurisdictional Challenges to State Criminal Jurisdictions under 
Constitutional Law. 
This Court has an opportunity to clarify the limits and bound-
ries of the Utah Court of Appeals Creation and Uniform Application 
of, State v. Haqen, Supra, and State Court Challenges for Federal 
Jurisdiction consistant with Utah's State Constitutional Disclaim-
er of Article III, Ordenance 2. 
And this case clearly presents opportunity to Establish Inter-
pretational Review of Relevent Legislation Creating Soveriegn Ex-
ception to Uintah Band Ute Indian Recognition, Association, and 
Affiliation under Aboriginal and Ancestrial Treaty Provision's, 
Guaranteeing Exclusive and Absolute Tribal and Federal Civil and 
Criminal Jurisdictional Authorities. 
This case has established a dangerous precedent which if not 
Clarified, other lower Courts might unwisely choose to accept. 
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BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
James F. Gardner appeals his conviction of a single count of 
forgery on jurisdictional grounds. We affirm. 
FACTS 
On August 14, 19S5, Gardner was convicted in state court of 
forgery, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-501(3)(b) (1990). The evidence before the trial court 
indicated that Gardner negotiated a check belonging to his 
brother-in-law to Rebecca Neary in Roosevelt, Utah.1 Gardner was 
sentenced to serve from one to fifteen years at the Utah State 
Prison. 
1. For purposes of this opinion, we assume that Roosevelt lies 
within the boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation. 
See Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F.Supp. 1072, 1188 (D. 
Utah 1981). See also State v. Hagenr 802 P.2d 745, 746 (Utah 
App. 1990), cert, granted/ 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). 
Almost four years later, Gardner petitioned the trial court 
for post conviction relief, seeking resentencing nunc pro tunc to 
allow him to take a direct appeal, Gardner alleged that he 
instructed trial counsel to appeal the forgery conviction and 
believed an appeal had been taken, but that trial counsel had 
failed to comply with his request. The trial court found the 
allegations to be true, and resentenced Gardner in accordance 
with State v. Johnson. 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981). 
Now on appeal, Gardner alleges that the trial court lacked 
jurisdiction over him due to his Indian status* As an addendum 
to his appellate brief, Gardner includes a personal affidavit in 
support of his claimed Indian status.2 The affidavit states that 
Gardner's paternal and maternal grandfathers were "full-blooded" 
Ute Indians;3 that both his motherland his maternal grandmother 
were enrolled as members of the Uintah band of the Ute tribe 
until their status was terminated in 1954; that his father is 
eligible for enrollment with the Uncompahgre Band of the Ute 
tribe in Colorado; that Gardner is associated with the Uintah 
Band of the Affiliated Ute Citizens; that Gardner is a second 
generation "terminated Ute"; that Gardner was raised, educated, 
and employed on the reservation; that Gardner practices Indian 
religion by participation in Indian ceremonies and culture; and 
that Gardner is known as an Indian rights activist. 
JURISDICTION 
Gardner alleges that the district court lacked jurisdiction 
over him due to his claimed Indian status. "It has long been 
held that exclusive federal criminal jurisdiction over Indians in 
* Indian country7 includes all persons found to be xIndian7 under 
federal law . . . ." Ute Indian Tribe v. State of Utah, 521 F. 
2. It is well settled that we do not review evidence presented for 
the first time on appeal. Munns v. Munnsf 790 P.2d 116, 119 (Utah 
App. 1990) . We therefore do not consider Gardner7s affidavit as 
proof of the facts alleged therein. 
3. 25 U.S.C. § 677a defines a "full-blood" Ute as "a member of 
the tribe who possesses one-half degree of Ute Indian blood and a 
total of Indian blood in excess of one-half, excepting those who 
become mixed-bloods by choice. . . . " A "mixed-blood" Ute, by 
comparison, is defined as "a member of the tribe who does not 
possess sufficient Indian or Ute Indian blood to fall within the 
full-blood class as herein defined, and those who become mixed-
bloods by choice under the provisions of section 677c of this 
title." Id. 
Supp. 1072, 1078 n.14 (1981) (citations omitted); see also 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1152-1153 (1984). 
Between 1954 and 19 56, Congress carved out certain 
exceptions to exclusive federal supervision over Indian property 
and persons. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-1300. See also Affiliated Ute 
Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 133, 92 S. Ct. 
1456, 1462 (1972). Under 25 U.S.C. § 677, Congress terminated 
federal supervision over trust property of the Ute Indian Tribe 
on the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, and ordered the partition 
and distribution of tribal assets between "mixed-blood" and 
"full-blood" members. As paft of that partition and 
distribution, Congress terminated exclusive federal supervision 
over "mixed-blood" Utes under 25 U.S.C. § 677v, which states, in 
relevant portion, as follows: 
All statutes of the United States which 
affect Indians because of their status as 
Indians shall no longer be applicable to such 
member over which supervision has been 
terminated, and the laws of the several 
States shall apply to such member in the same 
manner as they apply to other citizens within 
their jurisdiction. 
By terminating federal control over "mixed-blood" Utes, Congress 
expressly transferred jurisdiction over them to state courts. 
The challenge to jurisdiction based on Indian status could 
conceivably present a question of fact that would require remand 
for an evidentiary hearing. In the present case, however, remand 
is unnecessary because Gardner has not asserted facts sufficient 
to challenge the jurisdiction of the trial court. Gardner 
asserts that he is a "terminated Ute." The term "terminated Ute" 
is synonymous with "mixed-blood" Ute as used in 25 U.S.C. 677v. 
See Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 
128, 92 S. Ct. 1456, 1463 (1972). Gardner further asserts that 
he is associated with the Affiliated Ute Citizens, an 
unincorporated association of "mixed-blood" Utes organized 
pursuant to 25 U.S.C. 677e. Jd. .Therefore, even if we take as 
true the representations proffered in Gardner's affidavit, the 
trial court had jurisdiction over Gardner because exclusive 
federal jurisdiction over "mixed-blood" Utes has been terminated. 
CONCLUSION 
Gardner failed to present facts sufficient to raise a 
jurisdictional challenge. We therefore affirm his conviction, 
jut&z&Ci & Jf^wC 
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